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STATES OF EXCEPTIONALITY: PROVISIONAL DISABILITY, ITS
MITIGATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Dr. Fiona A. Kumari Campbell**

In recent years, a number of common law jurisdictions in North America
and Australia have delivered judgements, which, among other things, have
challenged traditional formulations of impairment and legal renderings of
disablement as existing independent of various technologies. In tandem with
these legal re-writes, some neo-conservative legal writers have advocated for
the reformulation of impairment along the lines of mitigated disability in
contradistinction from voluntary or elective disability – which denotes the
bodily and/or mental states of those who ‘choose’ to remain disabled.
Developments in surgical techniques and pharmacology have meant that it is
possible to eradicate, neutralise or morph impairment to the extent that
ontologically, the disabled person is transmogrified from an ‘impaired status’
to newly fabricated able-bodiedness. Disability constructed under these
circumstances can be figured as ‘tentative’ and provisional. This paper
discusses these developments in intolerance, a trend which implies that
impairment as impairment is intrinsically negative and explores what the
notion of tentative disability means to the understanding of citizenship, the
productive body and the valuing of difference within neo-liberal societies.

I. Projecting Disability?
The focal concerns of this paper are part of a larger research charter which
seeks to examine the ways that processes of ableism can be better understood
and subsequently how ableism in turn produces understandings of
disablement.1 This charter has two sites of interest that are addressed in this
**

Director, Socio-Legal Research Centre, Griffith Law & the School of Human Services,
Griffith University, Australia, Adjunct Professor, Disability Studies Unit University of
Kelaniya, Sri Lanka.
See Fiona Kumari Campbell, Inciting Legal Fictions: 'Disability’s Date with Ontology and
the Ableist Body of the Law', 10(1) GRIFFITH L. REV. 42 (2001) [hereinafter Campbell,
Legal Fiction]; The Case of Clint Hallam’s Wayward Hand: Print Media Representations of
the ‘Uncooperative’ Disabled Patient, CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD.,
443 (2004); Legislating Disability: Negative Ontologies and the Government of Legal
Identities in FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY, (Shelley Tremain
ed., 2005) [hereinafter Campbell, 2005a]; Selling the Cochlear Implant, 25(3) DISABILITY
STUD. Q., (2005); Litigation Neurosis: Pathological responses or rational subversion? 25(4)
DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2006) [hereinafter Campbell, Litigation neurosis]; Exploring
Internalised Ableism Using Critical Race Theory, DISABILITY & SOCIETY (2005); and
Bernadette Baker & Fiona Campbell, Transgressing Noncrossable Borders: Disability, Law,
Schooling and Nations in VITAL QUESTIONS FACING DISABILITY STUDIES IN
EDUCATION 319 (Scot Danforth & Susan Gabel eds., 2006).
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paper, namely the site of technology and the site of law. More specifically, I
am interested in how law mediates medico-technological formulations of
impairment that become transmogrified and codified in law.
Many years ago it was hard to imagine a scenario where disabled people
would be coerced into obtaining surgical, prosthetic or pharmacological
interventions in order to avail themselves of the limit pointed identity of the
‘disabled person’, which inter alia, enabled them to access social services and
legislative protections.2 In contrast, what is also difficult to imagine is a
situation where the juridical authorities endorsed a reading of legal disability
which in effect penalized disabled people who had taken steps, rightly or not,
to mitigate their impairments – only to find out that such acts of mitigation rule
them outside the purview of disability as defined under law. Such imaginings
are the source of this paper, which as the title suggests, probes the question of
citizenship and impairment in its ‘untreatable’ state.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part I contends that law operates as
narrative and provides an outline of legal baggage and backdrops. In this
section I argue that an effective method of deconstructing hegemonic legal
narratives on disability is to deconstruct the spatial assumptions embedded
within those narratives. The legal story-teller makes certain unconscious and
implicit choices regarding the spaces and places within which the narrative or
story unfolds. And, those choices, rather than being neutral, reinforce a
performative passion for sameness occluded by a deeply embedded notion that
disability is inherently negative. Part II is concerned with the encounter of law
with people with disabilities. Here I argue that legal texts plays a complicitious
role in authorizing particular representations of impairment and the permissible
ways in which the disabled litigant has standing with the law. Part III is a
focused discussion on the matter of mitigation. It first operates at the
philosophical level—in particular what the deployment of this concept says
about the status of disability and the disabled person in civil society. Secondly,
for illustrative purposes I survey legal reasoning around the mitigation in a
series of US Federal Court cases. Finally, in Part IV, the substance of the
paper is drawn together in a consideration of the implications of the recent
trend in case law and legal theory about mitigating impairment and the ways in
which disability formulations have the capacity to redefine disability as
provisional or tentative.

2
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II. Legal Baggage and Backdrops
Law has traditionally had an ambivalent attitude towards disabled people,
restricting itself to being an arbiter of rules and to policies of care and
protection. A. V. Dicey enunciates that the rule of law and its enactment in
common law constitutions is due to the rights of individuals enforced by courts,
and not the other way around.3 A frequent motif in the literature on the rule of
law is that the rule protects against the use of arbitrary power by governments
against individuals. Constitutionalist Joseph Raz, for instance, invokes the
trope of the rule’s curbing of power.4 Despite this insight, Raz raises the
pertinent concern about the elasticity of the notion of arbitrary power,
concluding, “… many forms of arbitrary rule are complementary with the rule
of law”5. One aspect of this paper’s focal concerns asks the question—does the
trend toward representing disablement in terms of mitigation represent a slide
towards the arbitrary use of power by government through the apparatus of
law? The insights of legal geography have pointed to the intersection of law,
space and power, whereby the spatial order of things (political, economic,
ontological and cultural) are lived before they are recited and theorized. Legal
texts invoke narratives that involve choices about which spaces and places to
include and exclude. These spatial partitionings can mask and obscure power
relations and power dynamics. Doreen Massey explains,
Social space can helpfully be understood as a social product, as
constituted out of social relations, social interactions. Moreover,
precisely because it is constituted out of social relations, spatiality
is always and everywhere an expression and a medium of power.6
Thus, critical legal geographers, the ‘space invaders’7, contest the notion of
neutral or empty space and point to the centrality of law as enacting spatial
hierarchies. Such cartographical dividing and partitioning, John Comaroff
asserts exposes law as “the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of the
power of an alien state and part of the process of coercion ... [which became a]

A.V. Dicey, cited from T. BLACKSHIELD and G. WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &
THEORY 105-106 (2002).
3

4

Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L. Q. REV. 202 (1977).

5

RAZ, THE RULE 202 (1977).

Doreen Massey, Space/Power, Identity/Difference: Tensions in the City, in THE URBANIZATION
OF INJUSTICE 104 (Andy Merrifield and Erik Swyngedouw eds., 1997).
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Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the ‘Third World’ in International law
and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L . REV. 913 (2000).
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tool for pacifying and governing colonized peoples”.8 What role has law played
in the colonization of disabled people in asserting the rule of ableism?
Certainly, as Thomas Barton points out, the law is more comfortable in
focusing on a singular place in the form of an individual person – case by case
diachronically, rather than in interrogating communally inherited beliefs
synchronically. This has resulted in a process of decontextualization, whereby
action is reduced to individual volition rather than being connected to context,
history and legacies.9 This topographical denial does not present any real
difficulties and is quite in keeping with the common law tradition, which as
Wesley Pue readily points out, is already anti-geographical—deriving its
meaning in an abstracted, acontextual way, removed from the spatially
materialities in which it is contested.10 When courts construct legal doctrine and
write judicial opinions, they do so by organizing and interpreting events and
ontologies of personhood according to a narrative in which the events and
characters "relate to one another and to some overarching structure, in the
context of an opposition or struggle."11 The elusive nature of impairment
(particular when lived out in a social context) and the problematical difficulties,
in some instances, of forecasting prognosis, does not neatly fit with the law’s
focus on rules, formulae and predictability.
Legal responses to the challenges of disablement persistently demonstrate a
performative passion for sameness.12 Not just any sameness, but paradoxically
and deliberately a sameness underpinned by shifting constitutional divides that
enact an ontological separation between ‘abled’ and ‘disabled’, where
‘mixtures’ are expiated through processes of fabrication and simulation. The
constitution of spatiality is an attempt to create order out of disorder (diversity
and difference) through a process of purification—the establishment and
demarcation of distinct ontological zones (disabled/abled, human/nonhuman),
and through a process of translation that acknowledges the reality of mixtures,
or as Latour puts it, makes visible the effort “… to extirpate ourselves from

John Comaroff, Symposium Introduction: Colonialism, Culture and the Law: A Forward, 26
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305,306 (2001).
8

Thomas Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment Culture, 47(1)
EMORY L.J. (1998).
9

Wesley Pue, Wrestling with Law: (Geographical) Specificity vs. (Legal) Abstraction, 11
URBAN GEOGRAPHY 566 (1990).
10

11

Patrick Ewick & Susan Sibley, Sociology of Narrative, 29 L. & SOC’Y REV. 200 (1995).

12

HENRI STIKER, A HISTORY OF DISABILITY (1995).
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those horrid mixtures as forcibly as possible by not confusing what pertains to
mere social preoccupations and what pertains to the real nature of things.”13
Furthermore, those who contest over the delimitation or specificity of
disability, I argue, are part of a desire to drive down disability—thus ensuring
that this class of enumerated persons remains problematically as a state of
exceptionality, defined rather than being figured as a significant part of a
country’s population. A state of exceptionality refuses to conceive of disability
as a form of difference that is inflected to different degrees throughout the
population and as a conceptualization that is spatially and historically
contingent. The role of biomedicalism coupled with law’s regulative aspect can
be found in India’s definition of disability contained in the Person with
Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)
Act, 1995 which reduces disability to diagnostic types: § 2 (i) a “person with a
disability” to “a person suffering from not less than forty per cent of any
disability as certified by a medical authority” (§ 2 (t)). And there you have it –
laws enactment of purification zones that attempt to settle the matter by way of
enumerative exactness and tend to any confusion by reducing disability to a
medical model. Of course it is not hard to see that the motif of disability is
much more than a state of being. Nationalism demands that the archetypal
normative citizen be free from flaws and matters of possible degeneracy. In
these times of economic rationalism and panics over risk and terror, the
sentiments of famous U.S. eugenist case Buck v. Bell14 find new credence:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices,
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. … Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.
The utilization of legal remedies by disabled people, especially after
acquisition of impairment, occurs within a broader sociological context of an
increasing ‘culture of blame’, where the disabled litigant responding to the
13

BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 100 (1993).

Carrie Buck v. James Hendren Bell, Superintendent of State Colony for Epileptics and
Feeble Minded, 274 U.S. 200, 208.
14
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codification of injury is required to show that he has suffered.15 For example,
when a court declares whether a disabled litigant conforms to a certain legal
rendering of disability, the court has to first construct a narrative in which a
character (the disabled plaintiff) is faced with an obstacle or conundrum
(disability discrimination) posed by an antagonist (a disability discriminatory
employer, for instance). In framing a disability discrimination case in this way,
a court is assembling a set of circumstances into an intelligible whole, into a
coherent narrative in which the actions and events are endowed with
intentionality, meaning, and purpose.
Indeed the whole goal of legal pleadings is context reduction and
reconstruction through the transmogrification of complex and often contrary
realities in the lives of disabled people into coherent, factual ‘stock stories’.
There are some aspects of non-conforming disability realities which are, so to
speak, ‘zoned out’ because they dispute the seemingly coherent ontology of
what a disabled person should be like. On occasion these outlaw realities of
disability are subject to being governed and therefore regulated by absorption
into anomalous zones. According to Razack, these anomalous zones are spaces
that tolerate departures from norms and therefore are places where there is the
possibility of norm subversion.16 Legal consciousness, combined with a matrix
of scientific ableism (biomedicalism) has produced a fabricated sense of a
‘natural’ (albeit colonized) space where the juridical tentacles of the law are
difficult to trace, let alone to assess what those fabricated ‘spaces’ enable.
It is the claim of this paper that spatial realities within disability law, due to
the ontological basis of spatiality, have produced the contours of disabled
subjectivity. This subjectivity in turn shapes debates about the purview of
citizenship, and about which impairments (and the degree thereof) are to be
seen as ‘acceptable’ in advanced capitalist liberal nation-states. In contrast, in
so-called ‘developing nations’, there are disputes regarding the best way to
discern the field of not-disability (i.e. the healthy comparator). Without the
specifically marked space of the disabled person where human corporeal
differences are partitioned from each other, it would not have been possible to
see the person who is ‘disabled’ (and who is not), to make visible the disabled
gaze. This paper has an investment in exploring ‘interest convergence’, a
See Wendy Brown, Wounded Attachments: Oppositional Political Formations in Late
Modern Democracy, 21 POL. THEORY (1993) [hereinafter Brown, 1993]; WENDY BROWN, STATES
OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995).
15

Sherene Razack, Race, Space and Prostitution: the Making of the Bourgeois Subject 10
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 357 (1998).
16
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concept developed by Derrick Bell to delineate situations where white people
with power endure or foster black advancements only to the extent that these
advancements promote white interests.17 Within the arena of the subordination
of people of color, the US Supreme Court in the 1989 decision of Richmond v.
Croson18 already revealed the limits of raced based interest convergence. Aside
from resorting to the usual technicist approach of legal formalism in
negotiating anti-discrimination law, the Croson decision significantly rewrote
the landscape of racial spatiality. In that decision, the Court proclaimed that
African-Americans had accomplished racial equity with white people, and as a
consequence of their ‘success’, African-Americans could no longer rely on a
history of racial discrimination to argue for the maintenance and introduction
of affirmative action programs.
A critical disability studies perspective invites us to explore the limits of
liberal tolerance of disability and the points of departure away from the
interests of ableism. The trend in courts of narrowing the definition of
disability by reframing disabled subjectivities and redrawing topographies of
disablement in terms of mitigation has already occurred in the United States
and this pattern in reading disability in law is likely to have international
implications. Theresia Degener and Gerard Quinn note that although US
Federal law is jurisdictionally autonomous from the domestic law of other
nation states, its flagship disability statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act
1990 [hereinafter ADA], has become a template globally, to the extent “… that
the international impact of this law [the ADA] is larger than its domestic
effect”.19 Regardless of where we live, the mitigation crisis will seek to
transform civic understandings of disablement as provisional and tentative.
This trend is of concern when the tendency towards a universalized
codification of disability (norms) is on the increase.

III. When Law Meets Disability – Possibilities and
Dangers

CRITICAL RACE THEORY THE CUTTING EDGE (2nd edn., Richard Delgardo & Jean Stefancic eds.,
2000).
17

18

Richmond v.Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional
Disability Law Reform, paper presented at “From Principles to Practice”, An International
Disability Law and Policy Symposium, October 22 – 26, 2000, Disability Rights Education
and Defense Fund, available at http://www.dredf.org/synposium/degener1.html.
19
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Disability studies proceed from a frame which figures disability as a
representational system of bodily differences and not a medical problem
primed with tragedy. Furthermore, I contend that the production and
designation of the neologism ‘disability’ (especially in law) cannot occur
outside of the purview of the processes and practices of ableism. Legal
reasoning is fundamentally ableist, just as it has been argued elsewhere that
hegemonic tropes of legal reasoning are inherently masculinist.20 Indeed, as
Rosemary Tong notes that increasing one’s understanding of the production of
discrimination in general is best done by becoming knowledgeable about
discrimination against disabled people. Disability, she argues, should become
the paradigmic instance of discrimination.21 At the font of this disability bias is
ableism. Ableism refers to
a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a
particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is
projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential
and fully human. Disability then, is cast as a diminished state of
being human.22
For the notion of ableness to exist and to transmogrify into the benchmark
subject of law, normate individuals of liberalism must have a constitutive
outside – this individual must participate in a logic of supplementarity, or in
other words act as a fictive comparator. This logic of supplementarity is
achieved through epistemologies of biomedicalism. Law is uneasy with bodies
that ooze or are leaky, especially those that are fat, distressed, sick, dying,
addicted and appear impermanent. These demarcations have become
increasingly relevant, as I will show later on in this paper when we look closer
at the mitigation conundrum.
Biomedicalism which assumes that impairment has an existence that is
accurate, significant and impartial, altogether independent of any social
context or discursive representation, has encroached on the psychic life of the
disabled individual because it asserts that disability is internal, inaugurating a
crisis within the person’s bodily or cerebral self. Disability is a state that
warrants medical interventions, curative treatment and mitigation of the
CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); CATHERINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
20

Rosemary Tong, Dealing with Difference Justly: Perspectives on Disability, 25 SOC. THEORY
& PRACTICE 519-530 (1999).
21

22

Kumari-Campbell, Legal Fiction, supra note 1 at 44.
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impairment or compensatory legal remedies wherever possible. Medicine in
cooperation with law is brought in to assess the ‘damaged’ body by utilizing
scaled enumerative scripts such as those typified by the Table of Maims whose
fiction is legislated into existence. Law’s investment in biomedicalism invokes
a moral landscape wherein the unruly body is culpable (and thus held
responsible) and the ‘real’ disabled body is innocent (and thus deserving legal
protection). Discourses around medical research, new technologies and
practices contain implicit narratives of disability as a personal medical tragedy.
This theory regards the existence of impairment and the experience of
disability to be inherently negative. As Michael Oliver puts it: “disability is
some terrible chance event which occurs at random to unfortunate
individuals”.23 Biomedical fabrications of ontologies of disability as tragic are
policed by law which has the authorizing power to say what disability is and is
not. By showing that a story achieves its meaning and persuasiveness by
burying and discounting relevant facts and often by restricting and fixing the
spatial scope of a narrative, dominant legal narratives fail to correspond with
material reality.
Increasingly, legal regimes are utilized by disabled people to access greater
resources and services to mitigate the effects of impairment, and as a vehicle
for the monetary compensation of loss. Recent studies suggest the emergence
of a paradox, wherein the application for disability benefits and compensation
can generate feelings of despondency as the disabled person engages in a
process of altered perceptions and puts on the ‘clothes of a disabled identity’.24
But for now, it is important to highlight the fact that the disabled litigant is
required to ‘identify’ with law’s rendering of the disabled person (for
recognition and access) before even commencing the process of articulating a
breach of rights and securing protective remedies.25 In the instance of disability,
the litigant needs to draw on a wellspring of suffering (‘wounded attachments’)
of grand proportions and like a parasite clasp the disabled litigant’s psyche into
the future. Under the ADA disabled people are viewed as a “discrete, insular
23

MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 32 (1996).

G. Holloway, Susto and the career Path of the Victim of an Industrial Accident: A
Sociological case study, 38(7) SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 989-997 (1994); N. Sayer, M.
Spoont & D. Nelson, Veterans seeking disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder:
who applies and the self-reported meaning of disability compensation, 58 SOC. SCIENCE &
MED. 2133-2143 (2004).
24

I am refreshed to see some exciting argument in this area by Laura Rovner, see Laura
Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2 UTAH L. REV.
247 (2001). Also my own piece, Kumari-Campbell, Litigation Neurosis, supra note 1.
25
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minority”.26 This figuring is an example of an attempt to reinforce the belief in
the fiction that disability is exceptional rather than normative. The insular
version of disablement also carries with it a negative connotation that Rovner
argues is “hard wired into law”.27
1990’s: backlash
Neo-conservatism,
compassion, exhaustion
Perpetual Sufferer
(Trope of
Injury/Harm)

999: The resilient
Responsibilized
Mitigator of Impairment

Figure 1: Shifts in legal performances of disability

Courts’ rendering of legal disability reflect the shifts in contested terrain
about the ways disability should be known, from the theologically inspired
notion of the disabled sufferer who seeks to prove injury or harm at law, to the
current ethos where increased corporatization of the welfare state emphasizes
the trope of responsibilization: a good citizen is one who does the ‘right thing’
by mitigating an assumed burden associated with their impairment (See Figure
1). Through the performance and enactment of disability subjectivities, legal
discourses play a critical role in maintaining the structures of purification
between those designated as ‘sick’, ‘well’, ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’.
Disabled peoples’ interactions with law necessitate that disabled performativity
and its ensuing subjectivities are iterated in accordance with discourses
mediated within a norm of ableism. Maybe the spectacle of the disabled litigant
acting out a part in the court would be amusing, a necessity instrumentally
justified to achieve a remedy, were it not for the enduring psychic
consequences of such a drama.28 However, I wish to reiterate that the
performances of disability in law produces subjectifying discourses where
disabled subjects are brought into being, not just for ourselves, but for the rest
of the population, inaugurating what can be said and what is unsayable about
disability. It is important to not just look at what is confessed within discourse,
Stacie Barhorst, What does Disability Mean: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
in the Aftermath of Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 138-171, 139 (19992000).
26

27

Rovner, supra note 25, at 250.

28

See Kumari-Campbell, Legal Fiction, supra note 1.
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in this case the trial judgments, but also whether there is a need to interrogate
the silences.
Injury then, and its companion response: mitigation of impairment, has
become the interpretative lens, the trope, from which to speak of the
experiences of impairment and its performative and economic impacts. In
short, the entry point of disability into law is through the doors of “deficiency”
– an assumed deficiency in the body, merging into a deficiency in character.
The art of lawyering is a process that involves fictional creations of truth,
where as Cain puts it “lawyers are imaginative traders in words. But these
symbols traders are also creative. They invent categories and these categories
constitute the practices and institutions within which their clients can achieve
their objectives”.29 In so far as deficiency and the tragedy of impairment are
assumed, liminality created by an ableist culture, and the ways law culturally
mediates difference and marginality become curtailed and hidden. The
necessity to embrace the trope of suffering binds enactments of disabled
subjectification into the perpetual vortex that signifies disability as negative
ontologically. The burden of negative formulations of disablement means that
the litigant with disability would have difficulty if she wishes to present an
affirmative approach to living with impairment colored with a mixture of joy
and despair. Such a representation is in opposition to dominant cultural
narratives of disablement as catastrophe and therefore as Rovner observes,
“law’s constraints make it impossible for [those] stories … to be heard and
recognized”.30
In summary, the inscription of certain figurations of legal disability requires
that disabled people’s ‘experiences’ be regulated within the confines of
juridical formations, which ultimately foreclose any alternative perspectives.
Interestingly, the delimitation and marking of certain bodies as ‘disabled’ or
‘injured’, bears little resemblance to varieties of self-referentiality attested to
by people with impairments and is ostensibly “imposed through policies of
repression and coercion”31. Legal rendering of disability through statutory
definitions and case law can produce a psychic dissonance between those
‘official’ imprimaturs and private realities.32

Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders,in LAWYERS IN A POST-MODERN WORLD 33 (Maureen Cain
and Mark Harrington. eds., 1994).
29

30

Rovner, supra note 25, at 277.

C. Emecke, Between Choice and Coercion: Identities, Injuries, and Different Forms of
Recognition, 7(4) CONSTELLATIONS 483-495 (2000).
31
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IV. Mitigation Compulsions or “The Most Envenomed
Serpents Admit Of Some Mitigation, And Will Not Bite
Their Benefactors”33
This section focuses at the philosophical level on the meaning of mitigation,
in particular what the deployment of this concept says about the status of
disability and the disabled person in civil society. For illustrative purposes and
to show that explanatory frameworks do inform judicial practice, I will survey
legal reasoning around mitigation in a series of United States Federal Court
decisions.
i. Philosophical conversations

Philosophical conversations about what I have termed mitigation
compulsions attempt to discern a number of questions related to the quandary
of impairment –such as, what does it mean to mitigate impairment? What is the
justification for mitigation? And finally do people with disabilities have a duty
to mitigate their impairment? In exploring these questions, I argue that it is
important to also think about how answers to these questions would differ (or
not) if we were responding to the mitigation problem for people of color, gay
men, lesbians and women. In which case, what difference does having a
disability make and why does disability make a difference? Evolutions in
techno-science continue to disrupt the fixity of defining disability and
normalcy, especially within the arenas of law and bioethics. The borderlands of
disability and the security of impassable crossings between the realities of ablebodiedness and disablement, mean that such orderings are not just repressive,
but ultimately productive: they tell us stories, they contain narratives as to
‘who’ we are and how we ‘should be’. In other words, as John Law rightly
concludes: “ … ethics will derive from ontology. And ontology, what there is,
is being made at least in part in narratives.”34 The fact is that hegemonic
narratives of disablement undoubtedly assume that disability qua disability is
The self-understanding of impairment is very complex. It is not clear about the extent to
which individual with impairments internalize the tragic scripts (known as internalized
ableism) not refashion them as acts of resistance. See Kumari-Campbell, Legal fiction 2008,
supra note 1 and Emcke, supra note 32.
32

33

JOSEPHUS, JEWISH ANTIQUITIES, xvii. v. §5

J. Law, Political Philosophy and Disabled Specificities (draft) (1999), Department of
Sociology and Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster University available at
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc026jl.html.
34
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inherently negative. I want to start, rather unusually on my part, with a
dictionary definition of the etymology of ‘mitigation’:
Mitigation: 1. Compassion, mercy, favour. Obs.
2a. The action of mitigating or moderating; the fact or condition
of being mitigated; an instance of this; spec. abatement or
relaxation of the severity or rigour of a law, penalty, etc.;
extenuation or palliation of an offence, fault, etc.; abatement or
minimization of the loss or damage resulting from a wrongful act.
in mitigation (Law): by way of extenuation or palliation (esp. of
an offence) in order to obtain a favourable modification (of
judgment, a penalty, damages).
b. Something that serves to mitigate; a mitigating circumstance or
provision; a palliative. Later also in Criminal Law: mitigating
circumstances collectively, esp. presented or accepted in
extenuation of an offence.
3. Prob.: a soothing remedy. Obs.
4. Softening or qualification of wording, etc. Obs.
5. Taming (of an animal). Obs.35.
At the outset, ‘mitigation’ signals a desire to soothe, to make mild or
gentle36 that which is being mitigated. When applying such sentiments to
disablement, the trope of soothing the suffering body under the guise of care
and compassion comes to mind. Moving through the definition, phrases like
“minimization of the loss or damage” appear through to “a palliative” (2b) and
interestingly, in point 5, a “taming” of an animal. Does mitigation then, when it
comes down to it, transcend a therapeutic response and really becomes a
strategy for taming the unruly disabled, possibly outlaw body?
The trope of restraint features highly in this liturgical/litigious play of the
courtroom and in the arguments utilized in judgments. One development is a
new way of classifying and portioning disability in law euphemistically termed
‘elective’ or ‘voluntary’ disability, and has attracted the attention of some legal
scholars. Proponents of the legal concept of elective disability argue that
Oxford English Dictionary Online
http://dictionary.oed.com/entrance.dtl.
35
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edn.,
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understanding.
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Etymology
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legislatures should distinguish between two categories of ‘disability’ when they
make assessments for coverage (protection) under anti-discrimination
legislation, namely, the categories of immutable and elective (or voluntary)
disability. As these legal theorists explain it, the category of ‘immutable
disability’ should apply to situations in which it is not possible (at least, not at
present) to eliminate the disability (where this term usually means
‘impairment’). Under these circumstances, a plaintiff should be deemed
innocent and, therefore, deserving. Proponents of this bifurcation of disability
argue, furthermore, that the category of ‘voluntary’ (‘elective’) disability
should, on the other hand, be used in situations where disabilities were caused,
continue to exist, or have been worsened by individual ‘voluntary’ conduct.37
The philosophical discussion of these proposed concepts is heavily laden
with the language of moral judgment. I have selected text from the argument of
Lisa Key. In an argument about the need to ensure the integrity of the ADA and
to maintain public support for that statute, she remarks that extending
protections to those people who she identifies as ‘’voluntarily disabled’ may
result in “the loss of protection for those who are truly deserving”.38 In another
hypothetical case of a janitor with a back injury who did not attend therapy, she
states “[he] refused to help himself, while at the same time expecting others, …
to bear the costs of accommodation”.39 No reason is proffered as to why the
hypothetical janitor may not have attended therapy. Further into her argument,
another hypothetical40 example of a man who sustained a spinal injury through
the ‘reckless’ behavior of diving in shallow water without first checking is
used. Keys paints a picture of an individual who fails to lift more than 30
pounds in a rehabilitation program. She concludes:
He is making an informed, conscious decision to continue living with the
impairment. This is his prerogative. However, society should not be obligated
to bear the cost of his choice.41
Elizabeth Key, Voluntary Disabilities and the ADA: A Reasonable Interpretation of
'Reasonable Accommodation 48 HASTINGS L.J. 75-104 (1996); Bonnie Tucker, Deaf Culture,
Cochlear Implants, and Elective Disability, 28 HASTINGS CENTRE REPORT 6-14 (1998).
37
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Id, at 80.

39

Id, at 82.

It is interesting the use of ‘extreme’ hypothetical examples as a rhetorical strategy to
support an argument, which I argue serves to incite hostility towards disabled people who
adopt ‘unpopular’ approaches to living with impairment and generally distracts the reader
from the core issues under consideration.
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Elizabeth Key, supra note 37, at 84. For a more elaborate discussion of Keys argument see
Fiona Campbell 2005a, supra note 1.
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The perspective of Keys reveals the anti-geographicalness of legal
reasoning, a kind of reasoning which denies the reality of competing demands
and intrudes into the lives of people with disabilities. These legal arguments
occur within the politico-juridical context that disability is ontologically
intolerable, a corporeal state that slips closely towards the precipice of the
human underbelly. Further I contend that arguments such as those proposed by
Tucker and Keys are underscored by the presupposition that disability is harm42
and impairment is harmful to disabled people psychologically, spiritually and
bodily and more particularly, that the existence of impairment is harmful to the
order of the polis, particular economic life.
The traumatic performance of disability at law institutes certain harms as
“morally heinous in the law”.43 Such a compulsion delimits a specific site of
blame by constituting certain legal subjects (and events) as responsible for the
‘injury’ of social subordination of that other subject’s experience. What kinds
of ‘harm’ have legitimacy before the law? Codification of case law has
established certain authenticated sites and specific instances of ‘disability
discrimination’ as harm. As I have already mentioned, what if disability as
disability (in and of itself) is considered as a kind of harm? I argue that harms
that recite the tragic interiorization of disablement are acquiesced within legal
discourses. Emecke refers to this kind of unauthorized ‘harm’ as a moral injury
of misrecognition where there is a “specific – mostly structural and permanent
– discrepancy between one’s self understanding and the other’s description”.44
Law’s role of scaling suffering and injury according to biomedicalist
perspectives can be contrasted with an alternative way of rendering suffering or
more specifically ‘injury’. Emecke argues that ‘injury’ captures those
asymmetrical power relations between self-referentiality and external retort or
perception, in this instance in the reasoning and pronouncements of courts.
This conclusion finds support in the writing of Laura Rovner, a legal
practitioner and academic who argues that under the ADA the disabled person
carries the burden of proving that they have been harmed. In order to do so, she
is required to adopt a victim identity, which may not only be in conflict with
her own sense of self but reinforce the very negative figurings of disablement
(as weak, passive, suffering victims) that the ADA purports to challenge. 45 This
42

One word for disability in French is ‘mal’ meaning ‘harm’.
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Brown, 1993, supra note 15, at 27.
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Emecke, supra note 31, at 484.
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Rovner, supra note 25, at 252 – 253.
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negative clothing of disablement remains even after the litigation has ended
and is difficult to shake off.46 In a rather bizarre outcome, the act of strategic
essentialism, (utilizing labels and ontologies of tragedy to access social
benefits) which might initially seem commendable and might even be viewed
as an act of subversive resistance, can also brings into itself acts of ‘selfdegradation’, wherein passports of recognition (the limit-pointed identities of
being a ‘disabled person’) become passports of unfreedom or anxiety.

ii. Casing Disability

Contest over the meaning of disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 1990 is exemplified in a series of cases brought in the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1999 known as the mitigation trilogy,47 More recently, the
High Court in Australia, in Purvis v. New South Wales (Department of
Education and Training)48 was asked to decide the definition (delimitation) of
‘disability’ under the Disability Discrimination Act, 1992. Disputes over the
definition of ‘disability’ in disability discrimination cases under domestic laws
are more often than not about broader philosophical issues about where to
‘draw a line in the sand’ about disability and non-disability. These disputes go
to the heart of ‘dilemmas of difference’,49 and how archaeologies of difference
are mapped. One thing that becomes clear in a number of ADA judgments is
the struggle by judges to deal with the arbitrariness of impairment. In the
District court case of Lawson v. CSX Transportation50 this conundrum is
brought to the foreground. The Court argued that should they fail to account for
mitigating measures “all diabetics would be considered disabled …A diabetic
whose illness does not impair his or her daily activities would therefore be
considered disabled simply because he or she is diabetic”.51 Later, the judges
exclaim that proposing to broaden the definition of major life activities “would
46

Rovner, supra note 25, at 253; Also Kumari-Campbell, supra note 1, 2006, 2008.

Known as the ‘mitigation of disability cases’ the parameters of defining ‘disability’ under
the ADA have been realigned, in respect to ‘corrective measures’ to mitigate ‘disabling
conditions’: Sutton v. United Airlines Inc., 527 US 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, 527 US 516 (1999); Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 US 555 (1999). I would
argue in addition that the ‘disability’ concept is already occluded – as prong of the definition
is tied to the notion of substantially limiting a major life activity’. §3 (2)(a) of the ADA.
47
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(2003) 202 ALR 133.
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See Minow, supra note 20, for a greater consideration of this issue.
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101 F.Supp.2d 1089 (S.D.Ind.2000)
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Id, at 1104.
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open the ADA to countless potential plaintiffs who have innumerable
conditions that cause their bodies to function in ways outside normal
parameters, notwithstanding the condition’s impacts on the plaintiffs’ daily
activities”.52 Rather vividly, Justice Antonio Scalia in Murphy v. United Parcel
Service is reported to have gestured in removing his glasses the dilemma of his
‘sightlessness’ and potential inclusion as ‘disabled ‘when acting without a
mitigating device.53
The juridical power of law and its capacity to name or erase different ways
of framing disability were put to the test in a series of decisions that the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down in 1999. There were three cases that altered the
definition of disability under Title 1 (Employment) of the ADA. The central
question in the trio of cases was whether disability should be measured in its
‘untreated’ state, or in light of any corrective measures that would give the
appearance of normal functioning. In its examination of the meaning of the
term ‘disability’ in the context of the ADA, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sutton
held that the terms could not be read to support the proposition that
determination of whether a person is ‘disabled’ or not should be made by
evaluating an impairment in its unmitigated state”.54 To the contrary, the
majority judgment of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held that:
if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a
physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures —
both positive and negative — must be taken into account when
judging whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in a major
life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the Act.
The courts complicity in the semantic recuperation of what constitutes a
mitigating measure may open a Pandora’s Box as various Courts’ attempt to
discern the difference between compensatory measures and corrections. Stacie
Barhorst concludes “…disabled persons who must mitigate their impairment to
survive will have no recourse against an employer’s decision.”55 Returning to
my earlier dictionary definition of mitigation, we may wish to reflect upon
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David Wasserman, Stigma without Impairment: Broadening the Scope of Disability
Discrimination Law, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INSTITUTIONS
AND INDIVIDUALS (Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000).
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whether attempts at mitigating disability are really about taming the beast, the
beast not of disability but of bodily difference.
What is interesting about these cases is that they illustrate some of the ways
that technological applications mediate various discourses about the ontology
of disability in law, and in attempting to mediate disputes over disability
discrimination enact discourses that traumatize and penalize the resistant
impaired body through ableist partitioning. They proceed from an assumption
regarding the efficacy of mitigation and thus bypass any potential conundrums
that problematize harms to the disabled person at an ontological or physical
level. Furthermore such ableist strictures require the courts to potentially to
anticipate “a person’s decision whether or not to pursue medical interventions
[as well as evaluate the status of] an operation [that] would have ameliorated
the effects of an impairment but was rejected as too risky”. 56 Instead of
clarifying (that is, securing) the meaning of disability and that meaning’s
relationship to the question of mitigation, the trilogy of cases (Sutton, Murphy,
and Albertson’s) have provoked a series of new questions with respect to the
technological morphing of normalcy. At stake is the rendering of the speciestypical body.
The Court in all three cases concluded that individuals who ‘mitigate’ their
impairments must have this factor considered when evaluation is made with
respect to their coverage under the lawful ‘disability’ definitions of the ADA.
However, none of those cases addressed the question of whether (as Key and
Tucker contend) individuals have a duty to mitigate impairment; that is, if
individuals ‘choose’ not to engage technologies (aids, prescriptions drugs, and
so on) that seem to mitigate their impairments, should they still be considered
disabled? For example, should a woman without arms be required to wear a
prosthesis or have a hand transplant in order to be considered ‘disabled’ under
the ADA? Whilst this line of argument was raised in the District Court case of
Finical v. Collection Unlimited57, it was soundly rejected by the Supreme

Mayerson, A. & K. Mayer, Defining Disability in the Aftermath of Sutton: Where Do We
Go from Here? (2000), available at http://www.dredf.org/mayerson.html.
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In one recent ADA case, the Arizona District Court upheld a claim of ‘disability’ (and
therefore coverage under anti-discrimination legislation) irrespective of the use of
compensating/mitigating measures such as prostheses. In Finical v. Collection Unlimited, 65
F. Supp 2d 1032 (1999), the plaintiff who was hearing impaired decided against using a
hearing aid on the basis that such a device picked up background noise and therefore was
annoying. The defendants argued that hearing aids should be included as a mitigating
measure. The court however held that an employee with a hearing impairment was disabled
irrespective of their use of ‘hearing’ devices.
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Court.58 We might extend these questions further in order to ask this question:
will current (and future) morphing technologies contribute to the framing of a
benchmark mitigated disabled body59 which is used to assess definitional
conformity irrespective of the matter of usage or ‘choice’? Will today’s
‘normal’ body be superseded, that is, become tomorrow’s ‘abnormal’ body? In
the next and final section of this paper I will consider some of the implications
that the re-spatialization of impairment as tentative or provisional disability has
for citizenship.

V. Aftermaths: Disability as Provisional or Tentative
For constitutions … are like principles that claim to be general, to
govern, to regulate. Despite the fact that they never did, this is no
doubt a sometimes useful fiction. One we will hold onto
sometimes, perhaps even much of the time – but also one which
we give up here and there in order to interfere and try to make
specific differences to the arrangements of specific institutions.60
… the ADA, as constructed by the current Court, can hardly be
said to do much of anything to protect people with disabilities.
Instead the Court’s activist interventionism has done a great deal
to shield both private employers and public officials, in addition to
denying the importance of past discrimination while preserving as
much of the pre-ADA status quo as possible. The Court’s central
message to people with disabilities seems to be, “Get over it”.61
In Australia, one method of discouraging full entry into the Australian
community, complete with full rights and responsibilities, is to give certain
classes of immigrant’s temporary visas. Likewise, other classes of immigrants
who are deemed to be acceptable as ‘new’ Australians have the opportunity to
It is beyond the purview of this paper to explore associated argument that asks the Court to
look at what a ‘similarly situated person’ would do? An exploration of the type of person
who would be deemed an appropriate comparator should be the subject of another paper.
58
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avail themselves of permanent resident status or indeed to become a full
Australian citizen. Keeping this motif in mind, disabled people, to a greater or
lesser extent, are still busy articulating entitlements to full citizenship status—
that is, having access to economic, political and cultural resources available to
other classes of citizens. Australia’s particular brand of welfare liberalism is
characterized by a residual orientation primarily reliant on paid employment
with a sharply targeted (restrictive) safety net of benefits for individuals who
for ‘no fault of their own’ are not in the paid workforce. The residualist
approach means that even those groups provided with assistance are positioned
out-of-bounds of citizenry – they are, so to speak, ‘remainders’,
euphemistically labeled welfare recipients. Patricia Harris provides a rather
snappy definition of what she terms the ‘moral-behavioral dimension’ of
welfare rationalities:
The ‘moral-behavioural dimension’ revolves around constructs
such as responsibility, independence, motive and effort. It
embodies governmental evaluations of proper/improper and
responsible/ irresponsible behaviours, suggests how people ought
to behave, and sets out governmental strategies to achieve the
desired ends.62
This paper has pointed to the emergence of conceptual and judicial realities
that err towards the notion of mitigated impairment in one country and is
already having various ramifications throughout other common law
jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada. This is what has already happened.
In this section of the paper I wish to move forward in time through temporal
and material space and speculate what could happen, should the notion of
mitigated impairment and its associated twin, tentative or provisional disability
become mainstreamed within law and service provision.
As part of this paper’s focal concerns, there are two spatial faultlines that
are easy to miss that no doubt frequently, but silently, coincide and
occasionally collide. The first faultline’s purview is jurisprudence and involves
the cause of action and scope of discrimination. In this scenario judicial
reasoning oscillates between seeing discrimination in “a cut and dry manner …
anticipat[ing] all possible scenarios and deciding which should be regulated
and how” and the converse response, where discrimination is conceptualized as
“…a problem of human interaction that is fluid and constantly manifesting
Patricia Harris, From Relief to Mutual Obligation: Welfare Rationalities and
Unemployment in 20th-Centruy Australia, 37 J. SOC. 5-26, 6 (2001).
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itself in new forms such that we have no clear sense of all the circumstances in
which it might arise in future or what to do about them”.63 The second faultline
is specific to the theorization of disability within critical disability studies and
the activist movement as a whole. Disability is viewed catachrestically, as an
unstable, spatially and historically contingent concept. Yet, rather
paradoxically, the notion of disabled people as a protected class is often
engaged with strategically as “…a valid and unifying identity that reflects the
real experiences and culture of a large group of people…”. 64 In this paper I
have alluded to the fact that the American Courts, when confronted with
knowledge about the fluidity of impairment and its potential unboundedness,
have in recognition of this state of impairment, sought to make disability more
workable by attempting to delimit impairment and make it fixed.
A lack of acceptance of impairment in it’s ‘untreatable state’ and the
consequential concept of disability as provisional or tentative re-asserts the
belief that disability is inherently negative – a bodily order that is awaiting to
be expunged. In the meantime, the mitigation compulsion leaves disabled
people with the sense that the only kind of impairment acceptable is one that is
veiled or hidden. Passing becomes an esteemed attribute. As Kimberlyn Leary
puts it:
Passing occurs when there is perceived danger in disclosure. At
its most extreme, it is a form of camouflage to sequester the self
from expected trauma. Its represents a form of self-protection
that nevertheless usually disables, and sometimes destroys, the
self it means to safeguard.65
The workings of internalized ableism by way of ‘passing’ are only possible
when viewed more broadly, moving away from a focus on the impaired
individual to the arena of relationships. For it is in the interactivity with the
norm (such as an ableized able-bodied person) that another form of erasure is
required. Ableist passing is not just about the person with impairment hiding
their impairment or morphing their disability; ableism involves a failure to ask
about difference, in this instance, disability/impairment. For internalized
Denise Réaume, Of Pigeonholes and Principles: A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law,
40 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 113, 122 (2002).
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ableism to occur there needs to be an existing a priori presumption of
compulsory ableness (or at least the illusion or aspiration of). Such passing is
about keeping the colonizer happy by not disturbing the peace, containing the
matter that is potentially out of place. The veiling of impairment hides trauma:
not the assumed trauma of disability, but where legal spaces are sites of trauma
and the notion of disability jurisprudence is perceived as traumatic.
The proposal to conceptualize disability as tentative or provisional, to
assign it spatially to a ‘temporary zone’, should not be confused with the
Jacques Derrida’s notion of deferability, where in our case the signifier
disability has its meaning deferred for the present, still impending and
awaiting.66 Instead, positioning disability as tentative conjures up the notion of
disability in waiting, disability standing in reserve for technologies that
imbricate use value, forming the productive body. Provisional spatialities of
disablement have the potential to realign social planning way from a focus on
‘care’ to that of ‘cure’. A shift away from the notion of permanence may mean
that governments will become hesitant to invest in long-term service provision
infrastructure and cordon off citizenship rights to more immutable, thus
protected classes in the population. The political and civil rights implications of
these speculations are unimaginable – disabled people who wish to seek good
fortunes are likely to feel compelled to resort to mitigation measures, lest they
be prepared to feel the full weight of being assigned the label of having an
outlaw disability. Hard to imagine – let us feel compelled to imagine so that we
can be prepared to act!
In this paper, I have engaged with the insights of legal geographers who
have pointed to a multiplicity of geographies all with myriad social, political
and economic spaces. Law’s agents, as traders in symbols have constituted
such phantom spaces as ‘voluntary disability’, ‘elective disability’ and
‘mitigated impairment’. A focus on these fabricated, isolated and atomistic
spaces of individualism has resulted in a shift away from examining the ways
that the processes of ableism in tandem with the sites of law and technological
create spatial divides, impassible crossings between the borderlands of
disablement and normalcy. It is heartening to remind ourselves that corporeal
spaces are in a constant process of rearrangement and because of this there is
possibility that their effect will be conditional, partial, indeterminate and
hopefully contestable. In the meantime, much imagination and vigilance is
Fiona Campbell, ‘Refleshingly Disabled': Interrogations into the Corporeality of
'Disablised' Bodies, 12 AUSTL. FEMINIST L. J. 57-80, 77 (1999).
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required to ensure the possibilities of safe, affirmative homelands of
disablement.

